2010-11-14
Original: 2010-11-14 on Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal
Transcript
Panel 1: A young blond man holding a yellow notebook labeled "ECON 1" stands at a podium-like setting, fist raised, addressing a panel of three older economists (a woman with dark hair, a woman with gray hair and glasses, and a bald man).
Blond undergrad: "MAYBE I'M JUST A NAIVE UNDERGRAD, BUT YOU KNOW WHAT NONE OF YOU 'GENIUS' ECONOMISTS ACCOUNT FOR IN YOUR EQUATIONS?! THE FACT THAT YOU'RE FUCKING OVER THE POOR!"
Panel 2: The three economists look stricken and ashamed.
Dark-haired woman (hand over mouth): "MY GOD... HE'S RIGHT."
Gray-haired woman: "ALL THESE YEARS... HOW COULD WE..."
Panel 3: The bald economist smiles and flips open a thick textbook, pointing to a page covered in equations and dense economics text.
Bald economist: "NO, WAIT. HERE IT IS. PAGE 862."
The textbook page (partially legible) reads, in part: "From eq. (11.2) it is clear that dp/dt = 0 if r_x - r_y = 0 which requires [equation 11.3]... When eq. (11.3) is satisfied, p is stationary because the effects of conformist transmission... just offset the effects of differential payoffs (the right-hand side). Thus, in the presence of conformist transmission, and for p in (0,1), the equilibrium payoffs to the norm favored by conformism will always be less than the payoffs of the more prevalent norm. Figure 11.1 illustrates such an equilibrium. For p in (0,1), dp/dt takes the sign of r_x - r_y. An equilibrium is asymptotically stable (self-correcting) if the derivative of eq. (11.2) with respect to p is negative, requiring that [equations 11.4a, 11.4b]... which is satisfied if the conformist advantage conferred on x by a small increase in p, namely lambda/(1 - lambda), is more than offset by the payoff advantage conferred on y by the same increase in p (the right-hand side). In figure 11.1, p* represents the solution to eq. (11.3) satisfying eq. (11.4a) and is hence a stable equilibrium distribution of norms. From eqs. (11.3) and (11.4a) we see that conformism has two effects."
Votey:
The bald economist, looking dejected, in a single panel.
Bald economist: "WHAT A HORRIBLE 3 SECONDS"
Blond undergrad: "MAYBE I'M JUST A NAIVE UNDERGRAD, BUT YOU KNOW WHAT NONE OF YOU 'GENIUS' ECONOMISTS ACCOUNT FOR IN YOUR EQUATIONS?! THE FACT THAT YOU'RE FUCKING OVER THE POOR!"
Panel 2: The three economists look stricken and ashamed.
Dark-haired woman (hand over mouth): "MY GOD... HE'S RIGHT."
Gray-haired woman: "ALL THESE YEARS... HOW COULD WE..."
Panel 3: The bald economist smiles and flips open a thick textbook, pointing to a page covered in equations and dense economics text.
Bald economist: "NO, WAIT. HERE IT IS. PAGE 862."
The textbook page (partially legible) reads, in part: "From eq. (11.2) it is clear that dp/dt = 0 if r_x - r_y = 0 which requires [equation 11.3]... When eq. (11.3) is satisfied, p is stationary because the effects of conformist transmission... just offset the effects of differential payoffs (the right-hand side). Thus, in the presence of conformist transmission, and for p in (0,1), the equilibrium payoffs to the norm favored by conformism will always be less than the payoffs of the more prevalent norm. Figure 11.1 illustrates such an equilibrium. For p in (0,1), dp/dt takes the sign of r_x - r_y. An equilibrium is asymptotically stable (self-correcting) if the derivative of eq. (11.2) with respect to p is negative, requiring that [equations 11.4a, 11.4b]... which is satisfied if the conformist advantage conferred on x by a small increase in p, namely lambda/(1 - lambda), is more than offset by the payoff advantage conferred on y by the same increase in p (the right-hand side). In figure 11.1, p* represents the solution to eq. (11.3) satisfying eq. (11.4a) and is hence a stable equilibrium distribution of norms. From eqs. (11.3) and (11.4a) we see that conformism has two effects."
Votey:
The bald economist, looking dejected, in a single panel.
Bald economist: "WHAT A HORRIBLE 3 SECONDS"
Alt text
Three-panel comic. Panel 1: An angry young blond undergraduate holding an "ECON 1" notebook shakes his fist at a panel of three older economists, shouting, "Maybe I'm just a naive undergrad, but you know what none of you 'genius' economists account for in your equations?! The fact that you're FUCKING OVER THE POOR!" Panel 2: The three economists look horrified and guilt-stricken; one woman covers her mouth saying "My god... he's right," while another says "All these years... how could we..." Panel 3: The bald economist suddenly smiles, flips open a thick textbook crammed with equations and dense theory, points to it and says, "No, wait. Here it is. Page 862" — implying the supposedly-overlooked problem was already addressed in the formal economics literature all along. Votey (aftercomic): The bald economist, now looking glum, says, "What a horrible 3 seconds" — the entire crisis of conscience lasted only moments before he found the rebuttal.
Transcribed by Claude Opus 4.8.